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This paper first provides an overview of the various senses in which the terms
‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ have been used in 20th-century linguistics. Twelve diﬀerent
senses, related only by family resemblances, are distinguished, grouped into four
larger classes : markedness as complexity, as diﬃculty, as abnormality, and as a
multidimensional correlation. In the second part of the paper, it is argued that the
term ‘markedness’ is superfluous, because some of the concepts that it denotes are
not helpful, and others are better expressed by more straightforward, less ambiguous
terms. In a great many cases, frequency asymmetries can be shown to lead to a direct
explanation of observed structural asymmetries, and in other cases additional con-
crete, substantive factors such as phonetic diﬃculty and pragmatic inferences can
replace reference to an abstract notion of ‘markedness’.
1. INTRODUCT ION
The goal of this contribution is to shift the burden of proof onto those
linguists who want to make use of a markedness concept in their theoretical
work. Given the huge amount of writings about markedness, I cannot
possibly aim to argue against every proposal found in the literature, but I will
try to identify and present the major markedness notions, refer to the most
influential works that have advocated them, and give reasons why I believe
that the relevant linguistic phenomena do not require a notion of markedness
to understand them. Most of the arguments against markedness come from
the earlier literature, so my own contribution here consists primarily in
pulling them together and highlighting the radical conclusion that marked-
ness should be abandoned by linguists.
Since it was first proposed by Nicholas Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson
in the 1930s, the term ‘markedness’ has been very popular in linguistics.
[1] Versions of this paper were presented at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology, Stanford University, the University of Stockholm, and The Free University
of Berlin. I am grateful to the audiences at those occasions. Further useful comments
were provided by Juliette Blevins, Grev Corbett, Michael Cysouw, and Anette Rosenbach.
I am grateful to everyone who contributed to improving this paper, including two JL
referees.
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MARKEDNESS AS COMPLEXITY
1. Trubetzkoyan markedness :
markedness as specification
for a phonological
distinction
‘In German, the phonological
opposition t:d is neutralized syllable-finally
in favor of t, which shows that d is the
mark-bearing member of the opposition. ’
2. Semantic markedness :
markedness as specification
for a semantic distinction
‘In the English opposition dog/bitch, dog is
the unmarked member because it can refer
to male dogs or to dogs in general. ’
3. Formal markedness:
markedness as overt coding
‘In English, the past tense is marked
(by -ed) and the present tense is unmarked. ’
MARKEDNESS AS DIFFICULTY
4. Phonetic markedness :
markedness as phonetic
diﬃculty
‘On the scale b>d> g>G, the
consonants to the right are
increasingly more marked. ’
5. Markedness as morphologi-
cal diﬃculty/unnaturalness
‘A singular/plural pair like book/books is
less marked than sheep/sheep because
the latter is not iconic. ’
6. Cognitive markedness :
markedness as conceptual
diﬃculty
‘The plural category is marked because
it requires more mental eﬀort and
processing time than the singular. ’
MARKEDNESS AS ABNORMALITY
7. Textual markedness :
markedness as rarity in texts
‘For direct objects, coreference with the
subject is marked and disjoint reference is
unmarked. ’
8. Situational markedness :
markedness as rarity
in the world
‘For marked situations, languages
typically use complex expressions. ’
9. Typological markedness:
markedness as typological
implication or cross-
linguistic rarity
‘The syllable coda position is marked
in contrast to the onset position. ’
10. Distributional markedness:
markedness as restricted
distribution
‘Object-verb word order is the marked case:
it occurs only with negation.’
11. Markedness as deviation
from default parameter
setting
‘Absence of noun incorporation is the
unmarked case, and the presence of
productive noun incorporation has to
be triggered by a specific parametric
property. ’
12. MARKEDNESS AS A
MULTIDIMENSIONAL
CORRELATION
‘The singular is more marked than the
plural, and the plural is more marked
than the dual. ’
Table 1
Twelve senses of ‘markedness’ and their typical uses
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It was embraced by European structuralism, generative phonology,
functional-typological linguistics, Chomskyan principles-and-parameters
syntax, neo-Gricean pragmatics, Optimality Theory, first and second
language acquisition, creole studies, and probably other research areas as
well. In the course of this process, two things happened. First, not surpris-
ingly, the term ‘markedness’ developed a multiplicity of sometimes widely
diverging senses that linguists who use it are often not aware of. Secondly,
‘markedness’ lost its association with a particular theoretical approach and
became established as an almost theory-neutral everyday term in linguistics.
Even though most linguists will be happy to accept that ‘markedness’ has
sometimes been used inappropriately, I expect many readers to be surprised
that it should be possible to argue for the downright elimination of ‘mark-
edness ’ from linguists ’ theoretical arsenal.
In section 2 of this paper, I will describe and illustrate twelve diﬀerent
senses of the term ‘markedness’ that are found in the literature. This list
should be reasonably exhaustive, although sub-senses could of course be
distinguished in a more detailed study. In sections 4–8, I will then explain for
each of these senses why in my view they are not required for the linguist’s
task of describing and understanding language(s). In each case, I will say
what ‘markedness’ should be replaced with – primarily explanations in
terms of substantive factors like frequency of use, phonetic diﬃculty, and
generalized conversational implicatures. Table 1 gives a preliminary overview
of the twelve markedness senses, with each sense accompanied by a typical
specimen of its use in the linguistic literature. (Another, more detailed over-
view is provided in table 4, at the end of this paper.)
2. TWELVE SENSE S OF THE TERM ‘MARKEDNES S’
‘Markedness ’ is a polysemous term in linguistics. The various senses with
which it is used are connected through their historical origins (ultimately in
Trubetzkoy’s and Jakobson’s work of the 1930s) and synchronically through
family resemblances. However, most linguists who use the terms ‘marked/
unmarked’ use them only in one or a subset of the various senses, and often
they do not seem to be aware that the other senses exist, or that the diﬀer-
ences between the senses can be rather dramatic (but see Zwicky 1978 and
Gair 1988 for earlier lists of diﬀerent markedness senses). There are very few
works that try to work with a concept of markedness which subsumes all or
at least a large part of the diverse senses of ‘markedness ’ (but see Moravcsik
& Wirth 1986, Battistella 1990, Andersen 2001, Ludwig 2001). In this section,
I distinguish twelve diﬀerent senses, grouped into four larger classes:
markedness as complexity, as diﬃculty, as abnormality, and as a multi-
dimensional correlation. In the final subsection, I briefly discuss the role
of markedness in Optimality Theory.
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2.1 Markedness as complexity
Under this general heading I discuss three of the twelve senses of marked-
ness, including the sense with which the term was first used.
2.1.1 Sense 1: markedness as specification for a phonological distinction
This is the original sense of the term as a theoretical concept, found in
Trubetzkoy’s work (Trubetzkoy 1931, 1939).2 In discussing phoneme inven-
tories, Trubetzkoy distinguishes various types of ‘oppositions ’ (relations
withinphonemepairs), among them ‘privativeoppositions ’, i.e. oppositions in
which one member can be said to bear a ‘mark’ (German Merkmal), while
the other member lacks it. Some examples that he gives are in (1) (Trubetzkoy
1939: 67).
(1) MARK-BEARING MARKLESS
(merkmaltragend) (merkmallos)
voiced voiceless
nasalized non-nasalized
rounded unrounded
Trubetzkoy’s notion of ‘mark’ is an abstract one that cannot be read oﬀ
directly from a segment’s phonetic properties. With regard to the contrast
between t and d, for instance, he notes that t is usually tense, while d is
non-tense (or lax), and that only the ‘structure and the functioning of the
system’ tells us whether it is d that is mark-bearing (the mark being ‘voice ’)
or whether t is mark-bearing (the mark being ‘tenseness’ ; Trubetzkoy 1939:
68). ‘Functioning of the system’ seems to refer primarily to neutralization
(see section 2.3.4) : in a language like German, where the syllable-final
position only allows t, the mark-bearing member of the opposition is d.
This sense of ‘mark’ was not widely adopted by later phonologists, so I
will not specifically argue against it here.3
2.1.2 Sense 2: markedness as specification for a semantic distinction (‘semantic
markedness ’)
Jakobson (1932, 1939, 1957) adoptedTrubetzkoy’s notion ofmark and applied
it to oppositions of lexical and grammatical meaning such as those between
male and female animal names and between perfective and imperfective
[2] See Gvozdanovic´ (1989) for detailed discussion of Trubetzkoy’s markedness concept and its
problems.
[3] However, the idea that phonological oppositions (or features) should be characterized by
the presence of a specification versus its absence has been influential also in more recent
times, especially under the headings of ‘radical underspecification’ (e.g. Archangeli 1988)
and unary features (often called, confusingly, ‘privative features’ ; e.g. Steriade 1995).
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aspect in Russian.4 Thus, using the example of ose¨l ‘donkey’ and oslı´ca ‘ fe-
male donkey’, Jakobson (1932[1971: 3f.]) said that oslı´ca bears a kind of
semantic mark indicating female sex, whereas ose¨l lacks any specification for
sex. For this reason, ose¨l is not incompatible with female sex and can be used
not only for male donkeys, but also for the category of donkeys in general
(the situation is similar to the pair dog/bitch in English). Thus, the diﬀerence
between marked and unmarked is not that between A and non-A, but be-
tween A and indiﬀerence between A and non-A. Similarly, Jakobson
(1957[1971 : 137]) describes the Russian perfective aspect as ‘concerned with
the absolute completion’ of an event, whereas the imperfective aspect is
‘noncommittal with respect to completion or non-completion’ (i.e. un-
marked).
This semantic sense of mark/markedness is less abstract than Trubetzkoy’s
phonological sense, because it is not just defined in terms of the system, but
also in substantive terms: the marked member is semantically more specific
than the unmarked member.
I argue (in section 5) that the semantic phenomena discussed under ‘sem-
antic markedness’ should be described with standard semantic concepts like
hyponymy and polysemy, and that generalized conversational implicatures
and their conventionalization are crucial for understanding the observed
asymmetries.
2.1.3 Sense 3: markedness as overt coding (‘formal markedness ’)
When linguists say that a category X is unmarked, while a category Y is
marked, they often simply mean that Y is overtly coded by an aﬃx or
auxiliary word, whereas X has no such overt coding (‘zero expression’). For
instance, Frajzyngier (2001 : 56) says in his grammar of the Chadic language
Lele : ‘Whenever a noun has a singular-plural distinction, the singular form
is unmarked and the plural form is derived from the singular’. This usage of
the term ‘(un)marked’ could be considered as fairly trivial and perhaps even
unrelated to the technical term ‘markedness ’, but note that the non-technical
verb ‘to mark’ (=‘ signal ’, ‘code’, ‘ indicate’) can also be used when a dis-
tinction is made clear by the lack of overt coding: linguists routinely talk
about categories being ‘marked by zero’, for instance. Thus, ‘ (un)marked’ in
the sense of ‘(not) overtly coded’ is diﬀerent from ‘marked’ in the sense of
‘signaled’, ‘coded’, ‘ indicated’.
Markedness as coding complexity has sometimes been understood in a
broader sense than simply overt vs. zero expression. Thus, Levinson (2000:
137) states that ‘marked forms_ are more morphologically complex and
less lexicalized, more prolix or periphrastic ’, and an example he gives is
[4] Jakobson’s markedness concept (or rather, concepts) is discussed in detail by Battistella
(1996: ch. 2). A very critical evaluation of Jakobson’s approach is found in Andersen (2001).
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The outlaw killed the sheriﬀ vs. The outlaw caused the sheriﬀ to die (cf. also
Horn 1984: 22). The second, ‘more marked’, construction is not formally
related to the first one at all – it only has greater phonetic length.
Although ‘marked’ in the sense ‘overtly coded’ looks like a harmless
descriptive term with no theoretical baggage attached to it, it is better to say
‘overtly coded’ instead of ‘marked’ (cf. Croft 2003: 92), and ‘uncoded’ (or
‘zero-coded’) instead of ‘unmarked’, in order to avoid possible
misunderstandings.5 For the broader sense, ‘phonetically longer’ should be
used if this is what is intended.6
2.2 Markedness as diﬃculty
Trubetzkoy’s markedness notion was language-particular and purely
structural, and substantive considerations were secondary for it. Jakobson
(1941, 1963), however, observed that the marked members of oppositions
were acquired later by children and were found in fewer languages, suggest-
ing that they are not only more complex in their abstract structure, but also
more diﬃcult for language users.
2.2.1 Sense 4: markedness as phonetic diﬃculty
A typical statement is the following:
Markedness: the tendency for phonetic terms to be pronounced in a simple,
natural way (as determined in part by the nature of speech articulation,
acoustics, and audition, and in part perhaps by more abstract cognitive
factors – all aspects of the human language faculty). (Anderson &
Lightfoot 2002: 101)
Phonologists have often avoided speaking of plain ‘ease’ or ‘diﬃculty’ as
explanatory factors, and have resorted to terms such as ‘ (un)natural ’ (as in
Natural Phonology, e.g. Hurch & Rhodes 1996), ‘ (dis)preferred’ (e.g.
Vennemann 1988), or ‘ (un)marked’, but it seems that it is precisely ease/
diﬃculty for the language user that is at the heart of these notions (cf.
Mayerthaler 1987: 27, who states that more or less natural/unmarked ‘really
boils down to more or less easy for the human brain’). Over the last decade,
phonologists have often used the term ‘grounding’ when referring to
the role of system-external factors in explaining phonological patterns
[5] Faingold (2003: 6) uses the term ‘(un)markered’ for this sense, in order to distinguish it
from other senses of ‘(un)marked’. Similarly, Wurzel (1998: 61) proposes the terms ‘fea-
tured/featureless’ for senses 1–3, as opposed to ‘(un)marked’ for senses 4–5.
[6] However, Levinson also includes lexical pairs like book/tome, house/residence, letter/missive
in his discussion, suggesting that for him the crucial factor is not length, but frequency of
use (sense 7).
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(e.g. Archangeli & Pulleyblank 1994, Bermu´dez-Otero & Bo¨rjars 2006).
Thus, when Ito & Mester (2003: 16) say that ‘dissimilation of identicals is to
a significant extent grounded in markedness’, they seem to understand
‘markedness’ as referring to these physiological, acoustic and perceptual
factors, rather than to an aspect of the language system. Other phonologists,
by contrast, have explicitly taken the position that while markedness
‘transparently reflects’, ‘ is based on’, or ‘ is rooted in’ (speakers’ knowledge
of) phonetic diﬃculty, it is still part of the phonological system (e.g. Hayes &
Steriade 2004). Unfortunately, the precise relation between phonetic diﬃ-
culty and phonological knowledge is often left unclear in the phonological
literature on markedness.
I argue (in section 6) that ‘markedness as phonetic diﬃculty’ should be re-
placed by ‘phonetic diﬃculty’ and other system-external factors (frequency
eﬀects, regularity of sound change).
2.2.2 Sense 5: markedness as morphological diﬃculty (dispreference/
unnaturalness)
In the writings of natural morphologists (Mayerthaler 1981, Dressler et al.
1987, Kilani-Schoch 1988, Wurzel 1994, 1998, Faingold 2003), the concept of
phonological markedness as ‘unnaturalness ’ or diﬃculty is carried over to
morphological structures. The idea is that certain morphological structures
are less preferred than others, because they ‘strain the human language
capacity’ (Wurzel 1998: 63). In particular, morphological structures are said
to be preferred if they have the properties in (i)–(iii).
(i) CONSTRUCTIONAL ICONICITY, i.e. semantic markedness in the sense of
section 2.1.2 (or section 2.2.3) correlates with formal markedness in the
sense of section 2.1.3. For example, English singular–plural pairs like
girl/girl-s are iconic and hence maximally unmarked (=natural), pairs
like sheep/sheep are non-iconic and hence more marked, and Welsh
singular–plural pairs like pluen ‘ feather ’/plu ‘ feathers ’ are counter-
iconic and hence highly marked.
(ii) UNIFORMITY, i.e. morphemes have invariant shapes. For example,
German singular-plural pairs like Boot/Boote ‘boat(s) ’ are less marked
than pairs like Zug/Zu¨g-e ‘ train(s) ’, where the plural stem is diﬀerent.
(iii) TRANSPARENCY, i.e. an exponent has only one function. For example,
German verb inflection is less marked in the singular with transparent
coding (leb-e/leb-st/leb-t ‘ (I) live/(thou) livest/(she)lives ’) than in the
plural, where the 1st and 3rd persons are syncretic and thus not fully
transparent (leb-en/leb-t/leb-en ‘ (we) live/(you) live/(they) live ’).
The markedness or diﬃculty of structures that violate iconicity,
uniformity and transparency is claimed to be reflected in a variety of diﬀerent
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domains: unmarked morphological structures are claimed to (i) be widely
found cross-linguistically, (ii) be acquired early, (iii) be processed more easily,
(iv) be aﬀected less by language disorders, (v) be used more frequently, and
(vi) be more resistant to language change (cf. Mayerthaler 1981 : 4f., Faingold
2003: 3–8).
I argue (in section 7) that the ‘unnatural ’ phenomena discussed under the
rubric of markedness can all be explained with reference to concrete sub-
stantive factors like token frequency, type frequency, and regularities of
language change.
2.2.3 Sense 6: markedness as conceptual diﬃculty
According to Givo´n (1991 : 337), ‘ [t]he marked category tends to be cogni-
tively more complex – in terms of attention, mental eﬀort or processing
time – than the unmarked one’. For instance, Givo´n claims that passive
structures are more diﬃcult to process than active structures (p. 352), that
the instrument role exhibits lower ‘cognitive accessibility ’ than the agent role
(p. 354), that definite NPs are ‘cognitively more complex’ than indefinite
NPs (p. 355), and so on. Similarly, Langacker (1991 : 74) says about the
singular–plural distinction:
It is natural that_ it should be the singular that is left unmarked_ the
conception of a single instance is simpler than one encompassing multiple
instances.
and R. T. Lakoﬀ (2000: 44) says about the markedness of the English past-
tense suﬃx -ed :
This extra morphology makes sense to us as speakers of English, because it
seems intuitive to us that ‘now’ is simpler than ‘then’. It is, after all, what
we are experiencing as we speak, not something that we have to strain to
remember or imagine.
Some of these quotations contain the words ‘simple’/‘complex’ rather
than ‘easy’/‘diﬃcult ’, but these authors clearly do not intend semantic-
conceptual markedness as merely consisting in additional specification or
narrowing, as in section 2.1.2.7
[7] A somewhat diﬀerent attempt at unifying the semantic relations between grammatical
categories (like present/past, imperfective/perfective, nominative/ergative, animate/inani-
mate, first/second, subject/object, definite/indefinite, singular/plural) was made by Bechert
1977[1998] and adopted by Mayerthaler (1981: 11–21) (see also Wurzel 1994: 2592): The idea
is that the unmarked categories in all cases reflect the prototypical characteristics of the
speaker, who is animate, first person, singular, etc. ‘and perceives some phenomena more
easily than others’ (Wurzel 1994: 2592). It seems that ultimately this approach, too, relates
semantic markedness to conceptual diﬃculty.
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I argue (in section 4.4) that ‘conceptual diﬃculty’ may be caused by low
frequency of use, and that it is often the cause for it. There is no need for a
‘markedness’ concept to mediate between cause and eﬀect.
2.3 Markedness as abnormality
Complexity and diﬃculty of linguistic structures has been found to correlate
with ‘abnormality’ in various senses, and ‘marked’ therefore has come to
mean ‘abnormal ’ as well.
2.3.1 Sense 7: markedness as rarity in texts
This is the easiest kind of abnormality to observe. Already Trubetzkoy
(1939: 235f.) was aware that there are systematic skewings in the text fre-
quency of diﬀerent phonemes, and he observed that mark-bearing phonemes
(see section 2.1.1 above) tend to be rarer than markless phonemes. Especially
Greenberg (1966) emphasized the importance of frequency for markedness
asymmetries, and he was the first to assign it an explanatory role in this
context. Text frequency/rarity has sometimes been taken as the basis for
definitions of markedness, although for some reason many linguists seem
to prefer vaguer terms like ‘ typical ’, ‘normal ’, ‘usual ’ to the precise term
‘frequent ’ :
To some extent, we can equate the term ‘unmarked’ with ‘regular ’, ‘nor-
mal ’, ‘usual ’ ; and ‘marked’ with ‘ irregular ’, ‘abnormal ’, ‘exceptional ’,
or ‘unusual ’. (Radford 1988: 39)
[T]he typical pattern or property is called UNMARKED, the atypical one
MARKED. (Archangeli 1992: 391)
Another example is Baayen et al. (1997: 14), who explicitly define ‘marked
form’ (of a singular-plural pair) as the form which occurs less frequently.8
I argue (in section 4), following Zipf, Greenberg, and others, that fre-
quency of use is an extremely important factor for explaining a wide variety
of asymmetries in language structure. There is no reason why we should not
use the words ‘ frequent ’ and ‘rare’ when we intend them.
[8] Confusingly, some authors say ‘semantic/conceptual/pragmatic markedness’ when they are
in fact refering to rarity in texts (of semantic/conceptual/pragmatic categories). For in-
stance, Haiman (1985: 148) rejects the identification of semantic markedness with semantic
complexity: ‘a concept may be marked because it is relatively unfamiliar or infrequent’ (his
example is female hippo, which is not semantically more complex than mare). And Bybee
(1985: 147) says that for stative verbs, the imperfective aspect ‘ is the conceptually unmarked
member’, because they occur more often in the imperfective aspect than in the perfective
aspect (for reasons having to do with the conceptual content of these categories).
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2.3.2 Sense 8: markedness as rarity in the world
Some linguists extend this use of ‘markedness’ to extralinguistic rarity. For
example, Comrie (1986: 87) observes for Armenian ‘a correlation between the
formal markedness of the locative construction and the degree of markedness
of the locational situation in the world being described’. Armenian can use
the simple locative case for ‘ in the box’ (tuph-um ‘box-LOC’), but must use a
(formally more marked) postposition for a ‘ less natural ’9 locational orien-
tation such as ‘on the box’ (tuph-i nera ‘box-GEN on’).
Levinson (2000: 136) uses the expression ‘marked situation’ in the for-
mulation of one of his central principles, as a synonym of ‘abnormal ’ or
‘rare in the world’ :10
What is said in an abnormal way indicates an abnormal situation, or
marked messages indicate marked situations.
I argue in section 4.2 that rarity/frequency in the world is strictly speaking
irrelevant for linguistics. All that matters is text frequency, which is some-
times, but by no means always, correlated with frequency in the world.
2.3.3 Sense 9: markedness as typological implication or cross-linguistic rarity
(‘ typological markedness ’)
Since Jakobson (1941), phonologists have been aware that the existence of
more complex or more diﬃcult phonemes in a language generally implies
that corresponding simpler or easier phonemes exist as well. According to
Kean (1992: 390),
perhaps themost common view ofmarkedness encountered in the literature
is the one based on cross-linguistic distributional analysis_ [e.g.] if a
language has a voiced stop, then it has a voiceless one as well.
Similarly, Archangeli (1997: 2) says at the very beginning of a textbook:
The term markedness is used to refer to [the continuum between language-
universal and language-particular properties], with completely unmarked
properties being those found in virtually all languages and extremely
marked properties found quite rarely.
[9] Note that ‘natural’ is used as a quasi-synonym of ‘frequent’ here, i.e. in a rather diﬀerent
sense from that found in section 2.2.1 and section 2.2.2. (‘Naturalness’ is of course another
term that should be avoided by linguists.)
[10] When ‘markedness’ is applied to kinds of language use, we have a sense intermediate
between 7 and 8. For example, Givo´n (1991: 335) says: ‘Formal academic discourse is a
marked discourse type in comparison with everyday oral communication’. Similarly,
Waugh (1982: 308) says that ‘ ‘‘spoken’’ language is the unmarked term and ‘‘written’’
language is the marked term’. (See also Andersen 2001: 24–28.)
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And Kager (1999: 11) says that markedness constraints in Optimality Theory
may be ‘validated’ by cross-linguistic studies, in combination with phonetic
grounding (as mentioned in section 2.2.1). The use of ‘markedness ’ in gen-
erative phonology ultimately goes back to Chomsky & Halle (1968: ch. 9),
where markedness values were a technical device to capture the relative
‘naturalness ’ of phonological structures, and ‘naturalness ’ is apparently a
synonym for cross-linguistic frequency or expectedness.11
I argue (in section 6) that typological implication is merely a consequence
of phonetic diﬃculty or other substantive factors.
2.3.4 Sense 10: markedness as restricted distribution (‘distributional
markedness ’)
More complex and more diﬃcult segments are often restricted in their
phonotactic distribution. For example, palatalized obstruents do not occur
before liquids in Russian. In German, voiced obstruents may only occur in
the syllable onset and are banned from the coda. An example from lexical
semantics is provided by Lyons (1977: 306f.) : English dog shows a wider
distribution than bitch in that it can be combined with the adjectives male
and female (male dog, female dog vs. *male bitch, *female bitch). More
interestingly, in gradable antonym pairs like high/low, old/young, only one
member normally occurs in degree questions like How old is she?
The positions where only one member of a pair can occur are said to
exhibit ‘neutralization’ of the opposition, and this was Trubetzkoy’s main
criterion for assigning phonological markedness values (as we saw in section
2.1.1). Thus, restricted distribution has been important in determining
markedness from the very beginning, but it has been taken as the sole defi-
nitional criterion only with respect to syntactic constructions. Thus, Dixon
(1994: 56ﬀ.) defines ‘functional markedness’ (which he opposes to ‘formal
markedness ’, i.e. our sense 3) as restricted distribution.
There are two diﬀerent situations in which two competing syntactic con-
structions A and B have been said to stand in a distributional markedness
relation. On the one hand, if B only occurs under specified conditions, while
A may always occur, B is said to be marked and A unmarked. An example is
German object–verb order in subordinate clauses: the order verb–object
[11] This sense of markedness has also been influential in the literature on second language
acquisition. According to Eckman (1977: 320), ‘A is typologically marked relative to B iﬀ
every language that has A also has B but not every language that has B also has A’, and
based on this, he proposes the Markedness Diﬀerential Hypothesis, which essentially says
that target language structures which are more marked than native language structures will
be diﬃcult for second language learners, while target language structures which are not
more marked will not be diﬃcult (see Rutherford 1982, Eckman 1996, 2004 for further
discussion). Typological markedness is thus used as a predictor of markedness as diﬃculty
here.
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occurs only if the object is heavy, while the order object–verb may always
occur, so the latter order is unmarked (Lenerz 1977: 27, see also Mu¨ller 1999:
782). On the other hand, a markedness relation has also been diagnosed
when B occurs under specified conditions, and A occurs elsewhere. For
instance, in the Mayan language Mam, the antipassive construction is used
when the object is not mentioned, when the agent is focused, and in a few
other cases, while the ergative construction is used elsewhere, so the ergative
construction is regarded as unmarked (Lazard 1989: 321). This definition of
‘unmarked’ as ‘the elsewhere case ’ is also found in Dryer’s (1995) detailed
discussion of markedness in word order constructions. Strictly speaking, on
the latter definition, BOTH competing constructions are distributionally re-
stricted, but the ‘unmarked’ construction is restricted negatively by the
marked construction, not by any positive specification (thus, ‘marked’ in the
sense of ‘positively specified’ is similar to the markedness senses 1 and 2).
‘Marked’/ ’unmarked’ in this distributional sense is a relatively harmless
term that does not suggest a high degree of abstraction or explanatory depth.
Nevertheless, to avoid misunderstandings, it is better to say ‘distributionally
unrestricted’ or ‘occurs elsewhere ’, rather than ‘unmarked’.
2.3.5 Sense 11: markedness as deviation from default parameter setting
In the Chomskyan principles-and-parameters approach, a completely novel
use of ‘markedness’ appeared: the idea that the possible parameter settings
are not equal, but that (assuming that the choice is binary) one parameter
value (the unmarked one) is chosen by default, while the other value (the
marked one) is chosen only if the evidence forces the choice.12
According to Chomsky (1981 : 8), the theory of markedness ‘ imposes a
preference structure on the parameters of UG [Universal Grammar]_ In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, unmarked options are selected’. In
other words, ‘ the unmarked case of any parameter represents the initial hy-
pothesis that children make about the language to be acquired’ (Kean 1992;
see also Haider 1993: 635).
Unmarked parameter values have been said to emerge in creolization:
Bickerton’s (1984) bioprogram has been interpreted as the set of unmarked
[12] In Chomsky’s work of the late 1970s and early 1980s, yet another sense of ‘markedness’ is
found, in the context of the distinction between core grammar (determined by UG) and a
‘marked periphery’ of rules that are outside the scope of UG. This type of markedness also
represents a kind of abnormality, but it was always unclear how core phenomena could be
distinguished from peripheral phenomena (Chomsky 1982: 110; cf. the discussion in Botha
1989: 86f., Battistella 1996: 80–89), so this usage of ‘marked’ and the entire core–periphery
distinction was quietly abandoned. (In the 1990s and 2000s, ‘markedness’ ceased to play a
prominent role in Chomskyan syntax, and recent textbooks no longer even mention the
term, cf. Haegeman 1994, Carnie 2002, Radford 2004.)
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parameter settings of UG (Battistella 1996: 103), and other linguists have
made similar claims about creoles (e.g. Roberts 1998).
Examples of marked parameter settings are noun incorporation (‘absence
of noun incorporation is the unmarked case, and the presence of productive
noun incorporation has to be triggered by a specific parametric property’,
Baker 1996: 283), preposition stranding (van Riemsdijk 1978), and extraction
from finite embedded clauses (Haider 1993: 643).
This model has also been adopted in phonology. For example, Blevins
(1995: 218) discusses syllable structure typology in terms of six basic par-
ameters, four of which are illustrated in the partial table in (2).
(2) COMPLEX NUCLEUS OBLIGATORY ONSET COMPLEX ONSET CODA
Totonac Y Y Y Y
Klamath Y Y no no
English Y no Y Y
Cayuvava no no no no
Blevins comments: ‘The parameter settings described above not only ac-
count for the generalizations noted [earlier], but are also meant to encode
markedness values, where ‘no’ is the unmarked value and ‘yes’ is the marked
value’.
A very similar position is expressed by Jackendoﬀ (2002: 191) :
[T]he ‘unmarked’ case is the one prespecified by UG, and ‘marked’ rules
deviate from the unmarked case qualitatively in just the same way as ir-
regular verbs deviate from regular forms_ UG renders certain parts of
the design space for words and l-rules more stable and/or accessible, with
gradients of relative ‘markedness’ as one moves away from the core cases.
The evidence in favor of these various proposals is almost always extremely
indirect and thus very diﬃcult to evaluate. Sometimes (e.g. in the case of
noun incorporation) the main argument for marked status appears to be its
cross-linguistic rarity. In such cases, this kind of markedness is a variant of
sense 9 (typological implication) with additional assumptions about the
source of the asymmetries. But markedness as non-default parameter setting
is very diﬀerent from all other markedness senses because its domain is not
linguistic categories, but cognitive states. It seems that ‘markedness’ in this
sense is best understood as a metaphor derived from other senses of ‘mark-
edness ’, in particular the ‘non-default ’ sense of distributional markednes. I
will not discuss this sense of ‘markedness’ any further here.
2.4 Sense 12: markedness as a multidimensional correlation
While the various senses of markedness in sections 2.1–2.3 are clearly dis-
tinguishable and to a large extent logically independent of each other, they
are mostly not incompatible with each other. Thus, markedness could be
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defined in a very broad way, as the conjunction of (several or all of) these
senses. This is the approach of Greenberg (1966), followed especially by
Croft (1990, 2003). But the combination of the various markedness dimen-
sions is not just definitional : according to the multidimensional view of
markedness, it is a remarkable observation that universally, comparable
linguistic structures exhibit the same markedness values for the diﬀerent
markedness dimensions (or ‘criteria ’). Thus, some categories (such as the
plural or the future tense) are semantically complex, overtly coded, rare in
texts, found only in some languages, and restricted in their distribution
(i.e. marked in all these respects), whereas other categories (e.g. the singular
or the present tense) are semantically simple, not overtly coded, frequent in
texts, found in all or most languages, and unrestricted in their distribution.
This is not logically necessary, so it is an important empirical discovery. The
following is a list of the properties that Greenberg (1966) discussed; oc-
casionally Croft’s terminology and definitions are used. Not all of these
properties were discussed earlier.
(i) TEXT FREQUENCY. This corresponds to sense 7 above: ‘If tokens
of a typologically marked value of a category occur at a certain fre-
quency in a given text sample, then tokens of the unmarked value will
occur at least as frequently in the text sample ‘ (Croft 2003: 110).
(ii) STRUCTURAL CODING. This corresponds to sense 3 (section 2.1.3) : ‘The
marked value of a grammatical category will be expressed by at least as
many morphemes as is the unmarked value of that category’ (Croft
2003: 92).
(iii) INFLECTIONALDIFFERENTIATION. Croft (2003: 97) subsumes Greenberg’s
three markedness characteristics of syncretism, defectiveness, and allo-
morphy under this category: ‘If the marked value has a certain number
of formal distinctions in an inflectional paradigm, then the unmarked
value will have at least as many formal distinctions in the same para-
digm’ (Croft 2003: 97; the original generalization goes back to
Brøndal 1940). For instance, German articles make a three-way gender
distinction in the singular, but SYNCRETIZE the gender distinction in the
(marked) plural. French verbs have a special subjunctive mood in the
present tense and past tense, but the (marked) future tense is DEFECTIVE
in that it has only an indicative mood form. In Sanskrit, the (marked)
dual case-endings show much less ALLOMORPHY than the plural endings.
This markedness correlate was not mentioned earlier, because mark-
edness is never equated with reduced inflectional diﬀerentiation. But
for Greenberg, this criterion was very important.13
[13] Greenberg also mentions two other characteristics which are of very restricted applica-
bility. One is ‘dominance’, i.e. the use of a single unmarked word in the plural or dual for a
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(iv) FACULTATIVEEXPRESSION. This corresponds to sense 2 (section 2.1.2), and
it means that the marked category is optional, while the unmarked
category occurs both with a general sense, and (‘par excellence ’) in a
specific sense opposite to the marked sense. Greenberg gives the
example of the optional Korean plural -tul. Korean nouns lacking this
suﬃx can be vague with respect to the singular-plural distinction, or
they can be interpreted as specifically singular (Greenberg 1966: 28).
(v) CONTEXTUAL NEUTRALIZATION. This corresponds to sense 10 above (sec-
tion 2.3.4). ‘In certain environments the opposition between two or
more categories is suppressed, and it is the unmarked member which
appears ’ (Greenberg 1966: 29).Greenberg gives the examples of number
neutralization of nouns with numerals in Turkish (where the singular
must be used regardless of the number meaning), of number neu-
tralization in Arabic verbal inflection in verb-initial clauses when a
nominal subject is present (where the singular must be used regardless
of the number of the subject), and of the use of the third person
singular in verbs used without a subject (‘ impersonally’) in Latin
(Greenberg 1966: 29, 36, 44).
(vi) TYPOLOGICAL IMPLICATION. This criterion, which corresponds to sense 9
above (section 2.3.3), is not prominent in Greenberg’s (1966) discussion.
It appears that it is useful primarily for phonology, where universals
such as ‘ if a language has ejective stops, it has plain stops’ make
meaningful claims. Croft (1990: 83) cites Greenberg’s (1963: 94)
Universal 94 (‘If a language has the category of dual, then it also has the
category of plural ’) as evidence for the markedness of the dual over the
plural. But withmost pairs of meaningful categories, such implicational
claims make little sense. For instance, we cannot say that ‘ if a language
has a future tense, it has a present tense’, because a language with a
future tense that lacks a present tense is practically impossible by defi-
nition. All languages allow the verbal description of ongoing events,
and whatever verb form is used to express such events has to qualify as
a present tense in a cross-linguistic perspective.14 Croft (2003: 88) ex-
plicitly claims that markedness is predicated of universal conceptual
categories, not particular linguistic categories, so that the question
whether a language possesses or lacks a category does not arise (he
heterogeneous group or pair (e.g. Spanish padres ‘ fathers’ for ‘parents’). This is relevant
only for a small number of lexical pairs (see the discussion in section 5). The other is
‘agreement a potiori ’, i.e. the use of an ‘unmarked’ gender in case of a gender conflict (as in
Spanish el hijo y la hija son buenos ‘ the son.M.SG and the daughter.F.SG are good.M.PL’ ; see
also Schane 1970). Corbett (1983) discusses resolution rules for gender agreement in some
detail (see also Corbett 1991: 290–293) and concludes that markedness is not relevant.
[14] Even in the case of the dual and the plural, it is questionable that languages having a dual
but lacking a plural would be logically possible (cf. Dryer 2004).
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therefore no longer includes typological implication among his mark-
edness criteria).
While for Greenberg (and Croft) all these correlating dimensions are
about equally important, there is one pair of dimensions whose correlation
has been particularly highlighted by other authors: that between semantic/
conceptual specificity (i.e. my sense 2, section 2.1.2) or semantic/conceptual
complexity (i.e. my sense 6, section 2.2.3 above)15 and overt coding. This
correlation is often described with the term ‘iconicity ’ (and this is sometimes
regarded as an explanation) :
From such a tendency towards iconicity in morphology we would expect
zero expression of semantically unmarked categories and overt, or non-
zero, expression of semantically marked categories. (Zwicky 1978: 137)
If a semantically more marked category is encoded as formally more
marked than a less marked category, the encoding is said to be iconic.
(Mayerthaler 1987: 48f.)
[The meta-iconic markedness principle :] Categories that are cognitively
marked tend also to be structurally marked. (Givo´n 1991 : 106/1995: 58)
[Iconicity of complexity:] Marked forms and structures are typically both
structurally more complex (or at least longer) and semantically more
complex than unmarked ones. (Newmeyer 1992: 763)
Iconicity favors the morphological marking of syntactically marked con-
figurations. (Aissen 2003: 449)
I argue (in section 4.5), following Greenberg (1966) and Croft (2003), that
the correlating properties of meaningful categories can all be explained on
the basis of frequency asymmetries. The first correlating dimension (fre-
quency) explains all the others, and hence there is no need for a term that
describes the correlation itself. Iconicity explanations are not necessary either
(see also Haspelmath, in preparation).
2.5 Markedness in Optimality Theory
With the advent of Optimality Theory (OT) in the mid-1990s, the term
‘markedness’ has become much more prominent in generative linguistics. It
most often occurs in the compound ‘markedness constraint ’, defined as ‘any
constraint that assigns violation-marks to a candidate based solely on its
[15] Recall that Greenberg referred to the semantic criterion as ‘facultative expression’, i.e. he
did not think of the marked term as more complex, and he did not see any iconicity here.
Croft (2003) does not recognize facultative expression or semantic specificity as a criterion
of markedness at all. (And for him, zero expression represents a violation of iconicity, i.e.
strict form-function isomorphism.)
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output structure, without regard to its similarity to the input’ (McCarthy
2002: 14). This is in contrast primarily to faithfulness constraints, which
evaluate candidates by comparing them to the input. This notion of ‘mark-
edness ’ is thus a purely formal one, empty of any substance, reduced to the
disfavoring of candidates based only on their properties. Of course, in
practice constraints with the right substance will work best, so OT prac-
titioners employ constraints like ONSET (a syllable must have an onset) and
NOCODA (a syllable must not have a coda), rather than constraints like
‘NOONSET’ or ‘CODA’ (although no higher principle excludes these con-
straints).
When one studies the most successful markedness constraints that have
been proposed, one finds that indeed their substantive content corresponds
to kinds of markedness that we saw earlier. In phonology, most of the widely
used markedness constraints seem to correspond to (or be ‘grounded’ in)
phonetic diﬃculty (see section 2.2.1 above), e.g. constraints like NOCODA,
*NC
<
(a nasal stop must not be followed by a voiceless obstruent), *VORALN
(vowels must not be oral before nasal). And at least some of the markedness
constraints proposed in morphosyntax concern meaningful categories. Thus,
Woolford (2001 : 513) has constraints like *ACCUSATIVE and *ERGATIVE,
Grimshaw (2001: 234) has constraints like *1ST/2ND, and Aissen (1999) has
constraints like *SUBJECT/PATIENT. These markedness constraints correspond
to conceptual diﬃculty (see section 2.2.3 above) and to the Greenbergian
markedness patterns discussed in section 2.4.
Thus, OT markedness constraints largely continue the tradition of the
earlier markedness literature. The innovation of OT is restricted to the for-
mal apparatus of constraint interaction. If we want to know why the con-
straints are the way they are, we are thrown back to the same issues that the
earlier literature grappled with: substantive factors like ease/diﬃculty of
perception and production, and frequency of use.
3. S IX ROLES OF MARKEDNES S
Before moving on to show why ‘markedness’ can be dispensed with, let us
consider the various levels at which the term has played a role in linguists ’
writings. Unfortunately, linguists are often inexplicit about the precise scope
of their claims, but the following seems to be a reasonably complete list of the
possibilities.
(i) MARKEDNESS IS REPRESENTED MENTALLY IN PARTICULAR GRAMMARS. In
Trubetzkoy’s and Jakobson’s earlier writings, it seems that markedness
is conceived of as a language-particular phenomenon (cf. Croft 1996).
For instance, in an opposition t :d, some languages could have d and
others could have t as the marked member. Similarly, Jakobson’s claim
about the perfective–imperfective opposition was only about Russian.
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Although the Prague School linguists did not emphasize this, their
claims seem to have been about speakers’ mental grammars.
(ii) MARKEDNESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COGNITIVE CODE (=UNIVERSAL
GRAMMAR). In Chomsky & Halle (1968), the idea was proposed that
markedness values are not just present in language-particular mental
grammars, but are in some way defined at the level of the innate cog-
nitive code for language (‘Universal Grammar’). This position lives on
in Optimality Theory in the widespread claim that markedness con-
straints (as well as the other constraints) are innate and part of UG.
And of course markedness in the sense of deviation from default par-
ameter setting (section 2.3.5) is part of the cognitive code.16
(iii) MARKEDNESS IS A METAGRAMMATICAL CONCEPT USED BY LINGUISTS FOR
THEIR CONVENIENCE. This seems to have been Greenberg’s (1966)
position. He observed that a large number of similar properties of pairs
of phonological, grammatical and lexical categories can be subsumed
under generalizations formulated in terms of markedness, but he made
no specific claims about mental grammars or the cognitive code. Nor
did he presuppose that these generalizations must have a uniform
explanation – in fact, he explicitly suggested that they do not. Also,
markedness as defined by distributional restrictions (especially with
respect to competing syntactic constructions, section 2.3.4) is a meta-
grammatical concept that seems to make no claims about speakers’
mental grammars.
(iv) MARKEDNESS AS AN EXPLANATORY CONCEPT. In Wurzel’s (1998) view (and
that of other linguists working in the Natural Morphology tradition),
markedness theory is an explanatory theory consisting of a set of
statements about structural preferences in languages. It is itself in need
of being explained by neighboring disciplines, so it is a core part of
linguistic theory, but it is completely separate from UG, and marked-
ness is not relevant to particular grammars. This view of markedness is
thus similar to Greenberg’s, but more technical, and it is explicitly
claimed that markedness is part of a theory.
(v) MARKEDNESS AS A GENERAL PROPERTY OF HUMAN CULTURAL MANI-
FESTATIONS. Moravcsik & Wirth (1986) claim that the correlation be-
tween the three main markedness properties (familiarity, diversity, and
simplicity) is found throughout human culture, e.g. in food: everyday
food is more frequent, comes in more diﬀerent kinds, and is simpler
than holiday food. Markedness in language is just an instantiation of
[16] However, according to Wexler & Manzini’s (1987) influential Subset Principle, the mark-
edness ordering of parameter settings arises from the learning procedure, and is not directly
part of UG.
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markedness in this more general sense. The idea that markedness is a
highly general property of human culture is already found in
Jakobson’s famous letter to Trubetzkoy from 1930 (published in
Trubetzkoy (1975: 162f.), and cited in Waugh (1982: 300f.), Andersen
(1989: 22), Battistella (1990: 5) ; see also Andersen 2001: 25–28). The
terms ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ have even occasionally been adopted
by scholars in other fields such as sociology (e.g. Brekhus 1998).
(vi) MARKEDNESS IN A NON-TECHNICAL SENSE. When linguists say that certain
constructions are used ‘only under very marked circumstances’
(Corston-Oliver 2003: 285), that phonological similarity implies sem-
antic similarity ‘ in the unmarked case’ (Johns 1992: 84), or even that
certainsentencesare judgedbyspeakers tobe ‘marked’ (e.g.Mu¨ller 1999:
782), it seems that they simplymean ‘(un)usual ’ in a non-technical sense.
Many readers will probably agree immediately that this last use of ‘(un)-
marked’ is pointless and should be avoided, so I will not say more about this.
As for the other uses, it is quite impossible to argue conclusively against all
of them. Claims about mental grammars, (i), and the cognitive code, (ii),
are notoriously hard to falsify, and the superfluousness of markedness as a
metagrammatical or explanatory concept, (iii, iv), can be demonstrated only
by a comprehensive alternative account of all relevant phenomena. Here, my
goal is mainly to sow doubt in the reader’s mind and to point to places in the
literature where such alternative accounts have been developed.
4. THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF FREQUENCY OF USE
4.1 From performance to competence
I will start with frequency of use (first with regard to meaningful categories)
because this variable can be shown to make five of the markedness senses of
section 2 superfluous. Frequency of use is a property of parole or perform-
ance, not of language structure or competence, and throughout the 20th
century most linguists have shown little interest in explaining structure in
terms of use. But the evidence that frequency is not just one correlate of
markedness, but in fact the major determinant of markedness eﬀects in
morphosyntax, is by now overwhelming (cf. Werner 1989 and Fenk-Oczlon
1991, who argue specifically against Natural Morphology).
At least since Horn (1921) and Zipf (1935), it has been known (to those who
cared) that there is a strong inverse correlation between signal length and
signal frequency, both in natural languages and in other human semiotic
systems. It has long been clear that this must be due to a rational principle of
least eﬀort or economy (see Haiman 1983, Hawkins 2004: chs. 3–4 for more
recent discussion).
Two mechanisms for creating such human semiotic systems have also
long been recognized: shortening of signs when their frequency (and hence
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expectedness) increases, and the creation of more rarely used signs by com-
pounding other signs. For example, the contrast between egg (=‘chicken
egg’) and ostrich egg may have come about in two ways: either chicken egg
was shortened to egg when these became much more common (after
domesticated chickens were introduced) or the term ostrich egg was created
by compounding ostrich and egg used in an extended sense (egg may have
referred exclusively to chicken eggs at some point). Whichever of these
historical scenarios is correct for this particular example, we have a fully
satisfactory model of explanation that makes no reference to markedness
and whose basic structure can be extended to all other lexical and morpho-
syntactic phenomena with similar properties.
That much of morphosyntactic and lexical ‘markedness’ can be explained
by frequency of use was in fact recognized by Greenberg (1966: 65–69), who
noted that frequency is ‘an ever present and powerful factor in the evolution
of grammatical categories and thus helps in explaining the types of syn-
chronic states actually found’ (this is elaborated by Croft 1990: 156–160).
Thus, I have no substantive disagreement with Greenberg, but I agree with
Man´czak’s (1970) early criticism that since frequency of use seems to explain
most of the observed phenomena, we do not need a ‘markedness’ concept to
understand them.
A phenomenon that is immediately predicted by frequency of use is
‘markedness reversal ’ (e.g. Mayerthaler 1981: 48ﬀ., Tiersma 1982, Croft 1990:
135). Under specific circumstances, we observe unexpected ‘marked’ behavior
of categories that are usually unmarked. For example, in some languages the
singular of some nouns is overtly coded and corresponds to an uncoded plural
(e.g.Welsh plu-en ‘ feather ’, plu-Ø ‘ feathers ’). Similarly, in some languages the
second person in the imperative is uncoded, contrasting with an overtly coded
third person (e.g. Latin lauda-to ‘ let her praise’, lauda-Ø ‘praise! ’). This situ-
ation violates iconicity (see section 2.4), but it is in perfect harmony with the
frequency-based explanation: only those nouns that occur more frequently in
the plural tend to have uncoded plurals, and only those moods that are used
more often in the second person (namely the imperative) have uncoded
second-person forms. Even more striking examples come from the lexicon,
where we have pairs like priest/priestess in male-dominated professions, and
nurse/male nurse in a female-dominated profession.Witkowki&Brown (1983)
show how changes in lexical frequency over time can lead speakers to adopt
new forms of lexical expression, adding a modifier as a word becomes less
frequent over time or dropping modifiers as it becomes more frequent. Such
‘markedness reversals ’ have been reluctantly admitted by markedness
theorists, who recognized that markedness is context-dependent (e.g. Waugh
1982: 307). The only way in which the relevant contexts can be defined is with
reference to frequency of use.
The ‘alignment of prominence scales ’ that is highlighted in Aissen’s (1999,
2003) work on functionally grounded optimality-theoretic syntax is nothing
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more than a formalist expression of the eﬀects of diﬀerential frequency of use
in diﬀerent contexts. Aissen states that ‘ in many languages, expression of
more marked configurations is morphologically more complex than that of
less marked ones’ (1999: 674), referring to the tendency for agents to be high
on the person, animacy and definiteness scales, and for patients to be low on
these scales. But Aissen’s ‘universal theory of markedness’ (1999: 708), in its
role of predicting cross-linguistic tendencies, can be replaced by frequency of
use and the least-eﬀort principle (agents are simply MORE OFTEN definite,
patients are MORE OFTEN inanimate, and so on; see also Haspelmath (2004b)
for discussion of Aissen 1999).
4.2 Accounting for rarity in texts (sense 7) and rarity in the world (sense 8)
My position here is that frequency/rarity in texts (i.e. primarily in everyday
speech) is the basic phenomenon that explains a lot of other linguistic
phenomena, whereas frequency/rarity in the world is strictly speaking irrel-
evant for grammatical theory because frequency in the world does not aﬀect
language structure directly (see Werner 1989: 42). Thus I need not account
for sense 7 (because I take it as basic), and as a linguist I see no reason to
worry much about sense 8.
Of course, from a wider perspective it is an interesting question why
certain words and categories are used often, and why others are used rarely,
even though we do not need an answer to this question to understand
language structure. But the answer will be non-uniform, because speakers’
reasons for choosing words and categories are very heterogeneous.
Frequency in the world is of course one relevant factor. The higher textual
frequency of the first item in pairs like cow/bull, sheep/ram, hen/rooster, poet/
poetess of course has to do with the fact that in traditional Western culture,
farms have more cows than bulls (Lyons 1977: 308, Fenk-Oczlon 1991 : 367),
more men than women get recognition for their poetry, and so on. But more
often than not, frequency in texts has nothing to do with frequency in the
world. For instance, the verb eat is much more frequent than go to the
bathroom, even though the latter activity is presumably just as frequent
(Ariel 2004), and beetle is much rarer than dog, even though the world has
many more beetles. Clearly, what we talk about is determined not by the
world as such, but by our perception of it and by what we find relevant. The
present tense is more frequent than the future tense not because few events
occur in the future, but because we cannot talk about most of them. The
singular is more frequent than the plural not because the world consists of
more individuals than groups, but because humans tend to focus on individ-
uals (and to treat groups as individuals, e.g. herd, battalion, cloud). The nu-
meral nine is rarer than four because with larger groups, we are less concerned
with precise numbers. All of these diﬀerent explanations are interesting (and
they could well be wrong), but they do not matter for explaining grammar.
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It has sometimes been claimed that frequency of use should not be taken
as basic because it is derivative of one of the other manifestations of mark-
edness. Thus, Mayerthaler (1981 : 136–140) claims that both unmarkedness as
unnaturalness (sense 5) and conceptual unmarkedness (sense 6) explain high
frequency in texts, without, however, providing a mechanism. Such a
mechanism is provided by Lehrer (1985: 399) (and similarly Waugh 1982:
302) : ‘Since the unmarked member may occur in a wider range of contexts
and will appear where the contrast is neutralized, it will also be more fre-
quent’. Neutralization may account for a small part of the frequency diﬀer-
ence, but a brief look at some figures should convince the reader that it is
totally implausible that all of it should be explained in this way. In
Greenberg’s (1966: 32) figures, the singular occurs in 70–85% of the cases, the
plural in 15–25%. To account for this diﬀerence, 40–70% of the contexts
would have to be neutralizing. In table 2, we see some figures from Leech
et al. (2001) for gradable antonyms in English (the topic of Lehrer’s paper),
showing that ‘unmarked’ gradable adjectives are between twice and six times
as frequent as their ‘marked’ counterparts. It is clearly impossible to argue
that neutralizing contexts like degree questions (How long is this rope?)
should suﬃce to account for this striking diﬀerence.
Another possibility, which cannot be dismissed so easily, is that shorter
expressions occur more frequently simply because they are short, i.e. the
direction of causation could in principle be the opposite to that given at the
beginning of section 4. In phonology, complexity does seem to be a causal
factor for frequency (see section 6 below), but I know of no evidence that it is
in morphosyntax. The hypothesis that shortness can lead to frequency can be
tested by cross-linguistic frequency counts, in particular by examining fre-
quencies of semantically equivalent expressions that are of different lengths
UNMARKED
MEMBER FREQUENCY
MARKED
MEMBER FREQUENCY
RATIO UNMARKED/
MARKED
long 392 short 198 2.0
high 574 low 286 2.0
wide 165 narrow 54 3.1
strong 197 weak 45 4.4
true 183 false 36 5.1
full 289 empty 54 5.4
beautiful 87 ugly 14 6.2
deep 97 shallow 15 6.5
Table 2
Frequencies of some gradable antonyms in English (from Leech et al. 2001,
per million word tokens)
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in the respective languages. It seems that coding length has no or very little
influence in cases like the singular-plural distinction, where one could suspect
that the English nominal plural is rarer than the singular because of its extra
segment (and sometimes extra syllable). However, Greenberg’s (1966: 32)
data from Sanskrit, Latin and French (where the singular usually has as
many syllables and segments as the plural) show that in these languages, too,
the plural is much rarer than the singular (see also Haspelmath 1999a and
2004b for similar arguments in syntax).
4.3 Accounting for overt coding (sense 3)
The correlation between signal length and signal frequency has already been
explained at the beginning of section 4 (see also Haiman 1983, 1985; Croft
2003: 110–117). Zero expression is just a special case of short expression, so
frequency explains both the narrower sense (overt coding vs. zero ex-
pression) and the broader sense (formal length involving greater processing
eﬀort) of formal markedness. As Croft (2003: 115f.) recognizes, frequency
correlates not just with the number of morphemes (as he had claimed in Croft
1990: 76), but also with the phonetic length of morphemes. If one wanted to
extend the notion of markedness to all situations where one expression is
more frequent and hence shorter than another, one would have to say that a
markedness relation is even found in pairs like ten/hundred, son/brother,
stomach/appendix, sparrow/albatross, comma/apostrophe,moon/Uranus,walk/
gallop, flu/leukemia. Greenberg does so for the first two pairs, but it is clearly
more parsimonious to just eliminate ‘markedness’ and describe and explain
these cases directly in terms of frequency and phonetic length.
4.4 Accounting for conceptual diﬃculty (sense 6)
A category that is used more frequently will not just be shorter, but also of
course easier to process in a number of ways, than a rarely used category
(see e.g. Fenk-Oczlon (1991: 373–381) for the role of frequency in language
acquisition, language deficits, processing, and leveling). The connection be-
tween frequency of use and ease of processing is well known from the psy-
chological literature. For example, if ‘passive clauses are processed with more
diﬃculty and acquired later by children than active clauses’ (Givo´n 1991),
this is probably due to their lower frequency, and not to their markedness.
In other cases, ‘conceptual diﬃculty’ is apparently the cause for the lower
frequency of a category. Langacker (1991 : 74) seems to be right in saying that
‘the conception of a single instance is simpler than one encompassing mul-
tiple instances ’, or at least this would explain why we use the singular more
often than the plural.
Thus, in some cases frequency of use explains conceptual or cognitive ease,
in other cases it is the other way round. There is no need for a concept of
‘markedness’.
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4.5 Accounting for the multidimensional correlation (sense 12)
After presenting the markedness correlations, Greenberg (1966: 65) con-
cludes that, in grammar and lexicon, frequency of use is ‘primary’, i.e. ex-
plains the other markedness correlates. He even goes so far as to suggest that
the terms marked/unmarked should be defined as ‘ less frequent/more fre-
quent’ (p. 67). Croft (2003: 102) follows him: ‘The more general theoretical
concepts are economic and iconic motivation, not typological markedness ’.
Man´czak (1970) criticized Greenberg for using the Praguean ‘markedness’
concept for phenomena that can be shown to be derived entirely from fre-
quency, and I believe that Man´czak was essentially right. However, this
extension of the term ‘markedness ’ had already been begun by Jakobson
(1963) for phonology, and Greenberg understandably found the universal
markedness predictions of Jakobson’s later work more interesting than the
strictly language-particular, purely classificatory markedness conception of
the 1930s.
Let us briefly review how frequency of use explains the correlates.
(i) TEXT FREQUENCY. This is not explained, but is the explanatory factor.
(ii) STRUCTURAL CODING. As we saw above (section 4.1), if grammars
are designed economically, they will use zero-coding for the most fre-
quent category in a set of paradigmatic alternatives. Speakers can
(unconsciously) bring this about by shortening earlier overt markers,
or by using the most frequent form as the base for new formations.
(iii) INFLECTIONALDIFFERENTIATION. The reason why more frequent categor-
ies show greater allomorphy or more irregularities is that these are
more easily remembered when the category occurs often. By contrast,
infrequent forms ‘must follow analogically other parts of the system,
while only a fairly frequent form can preserve irregularities ’
(Greenberg 1966: 68f.). As Man´czak (1970: 33f.) notes, the same is true
in the lexicon: suppletion and other irregularities occur primarily in
high-frequency items (cf. brother/sister, stallion/mare, vs. lion/lioness,
male hippo/female hippo). The same principle applies to syncretism
(and defectiveness) : syncretism is generally found to a greater extent in
rarer inflectional categories (and more generally in rarer words/word
types) because it is more diﬃcult to remember the distinct forms when
they do not occur often (Croft 2003: 113, Hawkins 2004: ch. 4).
These three properties – frequency, coding and diﬀerentiation – are re-
garded as the core dimensions of markedness by Croft (2003). But one other
dimension also has an explanation in terms of frequency, namely facultative
expression.
(iv) FACULTATIVE EXPRESSION. Greenberg gives examples of optional plur-
als, duals, and future and past tenses. Let us first consider the case of
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optional plurals, as in Korean. Here we would probably want to say
that the ‘singular ’ form (which can also refer to groups) does not in
fact have singular meaning, but is a ‘general number’ form (Corbett
2000: 9–19). The reason why it is often interpreted (‘par excellence’) as
singular is simply that this is the most frequent situation; for example,
when the word chayk ‘book’ is used, most of the time a single book is
referred to, so speakers adopt this as the default hypothesis and revise
this hypothesis only if needed. (See section 5 for further discussion.)
The remaining two dimensions do not seem to have a frequency expla-
nation, but we already saw in section 2.4 that ‘typological implication’ (vi)
is not an empirically observable correlate. As for contextual neutralization
(cf. (v) in section 2.4), Croft (2003: 100f.) argues that it simply fails to cor-
relate with the other dimensions: ‘ there is no cross-linguistic consistency as
to which value is chosen’. For instance, in some languages the masculine is
used for referents of unknown sex, while in other languages the feminine is
chosen (e.g. Jarawara, Dixon 2004: 286). Greenberg himself noted that with
respect to syncretism, neuter is the most marked gender in Indo-European,
but with respect to contextual neutralization, it patterns as the unmarked
gender (1966: 39f.) ; and in English, the plural pronoun they can be used for
singular reference when the gender is neutralized.
The only generalization that seems to be fairly robust cross-linguistically is
the consistent use of singular number and 3rd person agreement forms when
a controller is missing or has no relevant features. In most cases this can be
explained by economy, because the 3rd person singular forms usually have
the least overt coding, and when no relevant information is conveyed, it
would be uneconomical to use overt coding elements when no information is
in fact conveyed. However, a small residue of unexplained facts remains, for
instance, the fact that in Latin (which has no zero forms in its verbal subject
inflection) we find 3rd person, rather than another person, in subjectless
verbs like pluit ‘ it is raining’ or oportet ‘ it is necessary’. From the point of
view of pure economy, one would expect special zero-coded forms here (plui,
oporte).17 This residue is hardly suﬃcient to motivate keeping a ‘markedness’
concept in linguistics.
5. REPLAC ING ‘ SEMANT IC MARKEDNES S’
Semantic markedness has sometimes been regarded as an extremely general
phenomenon that encompasses much more than just some grammatical and
lexical semantic contrasts. Greenberg (1966: 25), for example, invokes
[17] That such forms are impossible seems to be related to the fact that some languages require a
dummy subject pronoun, like English it or French il, in such constructions.
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[t]he pervasive nature in human thinking of this tendency to take one of
the members of an oppositional category as unmarked so that it represents
either the entire category or par excellence the opposite member to the
marked category
and mentions the role this tendency plays in mathematical symbols (‘5 ’ can
stand either for ‘ |5| ’ or for ‘+5’), and the widely found double use of words
for ‘human being’ to also denote a member of the tribe speaking the language
(e.g. in the Maidu language, majdy means ‘human being’ or ‘Maidu person’,
contrasting with the ‘marked’ expressions kombom majdy ‘Yana person’,
wolem majdy ‘white person’, and so on).
The general property of ‘human thinking’ that is involved here is the fact
that our communication is guided by highly general pragmatic principles of
the sort that have been discussed in the neo-Gricean literature (e.g. Horn
1984, Levinson 2000). Specifically, in cases like majdy the highly general
Principle of Informativeness (‘I-Principle ’) is relevant, which allows the
hearer to enrich the interpretation of an utterance if no further specification
is given by the speaker. Thus, if p, q can be interpreted as communicating by
implicature ‘ if and only if p, q’, and p and q can be interpreted as intending
‘p and therefore q’. Similarly, in the context of Maidu society, the word
majdy ‘human being’ will ordinarily be understood as referring to a Maidu
person, because if the speaker had unexpectedly intended a non-Maidu, she
would of course have used a special expression. The Maidu word majdy need
not be polysemous or bi-functional at all. It probably just means ‘human
being’, and the Maidu language simply lacks a conventional word for
‘Maidu person’. There is thus no need to appeal to markedness in such cases.
We do need Gricean pragmatic principles of utterance interpretation to
understand how language functions and is structured, but these principles
are far more general.
Something very much like the distinction between semantic content (what
is said) and pragmatic implicatures (what it communicates) is already present
in Jakobson’s (1932[1971: 3f.]) discussion of the conditions under which the
zero-meaning of the unmarked member (representing the entire category,
e.g. Russian ose¨l for ‘donkey in general ’) occurs as opposed to the minus-
meaning (representing par excellence the opposite member to the marked
member, e.g. ose¨l for ‘male donkey’).18 He says that the minus-meaning is
just a situationally conditioned use of the category (i.e. an implicature) which
should not be confused with its general meaning (i.e. its semantic content).
However, he does not specify under what conditions the minus-meaning
arises. Waugh (1982: 304) says that it occurs ‘ in individuating contexts and
with an implicit or explicit contrast between marked and unmarked’.
[18] The terms ‘zero-meaning’ and ‘minus-meaning’ are from Waugh (1982).
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Jakobson gives the following example, where the interpretation ‘male don-
key’ (the minus-meaning) seems to arise because of the contrastive context.
(3) E`to oslı´ca? Ne´t, ose¨l.
‘ Is that a female donkey? No, a male donkey. ’
However, in most lexical pairs in which one member is semantically more
specific, no such minus-meaning arises in contrastive contexts:
(4) (a) Is that a bus? *No, a vehicle.
(b) Is that a microorganism? *No, an organism.
(c) Is that horse galloping? *No, it’s moving.
In the neo-Gricean tradition, it is generally assumed that no special contexts
are needed to trigger Informativeness-based implicatures like ‘ ‘‘human
being’’ (in a Maidu context) implicates ‘‘Maidu person’’ ’. On the contrary,
these implicatures are canceled only under specific conditions, namely when
they are explicitly contradicted (‘That’s a human being, but not from our
tribe’). Thus, informativeness-based implicatures cannot be the whole story
for pairs like Russian oslı´ca/ose¨l (or the analogous English lioness/lion).
Now as is well known, pragmatic inferences (implicatures) may become so
common that at some point they are reanalyzed as being not just part of
what is communicated, but part of what is said, i.e. they become non-
cancelable. Consider, as an example, the word America. Originally this re-
ferred to the entire continent in the western hemisphere that Europeans had
become aware of after 1492. But English speakers of course used America
primarily for the part of the continent that was settled from England, and
nowadays it has become restricted to the United States of America. It is no
longer possible to cancel this enriched meaning in English (*I’m from
America, more specifically from South America). The enriched meaning has
become conventionalized.
Similarly, Witkowski & Brown (1983: 571f.) report on ‘markedness re-
versal ’ in the word for ‘deer’ (cˇih) in several Mayan languages of Chiapas
(Mexico). When sheep were introduced by the European invaders, these were
referred to as ‘cotton deer ’ (Tzeltal : tunim cˇih, Tzotzil : tusˇnok ’ cˇih). As sheep
became more important in Chiapas culture, there was less and less need for
the additional specification, and the simple word cˇih is now used for ‘sheep’.
To refer to ‘deer’, Tzotzil now uses the optional modifier te?tikil ‘wild ’
(te?tikil cˇih), so in this language cˇih can still be said to be vague with respect
to the sheep vs. deer distinction. In Tenejapa Tzeltal, by contrast, the modifier
is now obligatory, and cˇih alone can only mean ‘sheep’. What was originally
an Informativeness-based implicature is now the conventional meaning.
In order to explain why it is possible to say E`to oslı´ca? Ne´t, ose¨l in Russian
and Is that a lioness? No, a lion in English (for many speakers), we have to
assume some conventionalization. The pair lioness/lion has similarities both
to the pair female frog/frog (where we have a simple hyponym/hyperonym
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relation) and to the pair princess/prince (where the two members are clearly
mutually exclusive). The suﬃx -ess may have functioned just like the adjec-
tive female at an earlier time, so that the relation was one of pure hyponymy.
But now the suﬃx -ess is obligatory when referring to females, and prince has
become restricted to males. This is much like the restriction of America to the
United States, and the obligatoriness of the modifiers North and South for
referring to the purely geographical concepts. The pair lioness/lion seems to
show incipient conventionalization.
Now one might say that it is precisely for term pairs with incipient con-
ventionalization like ose¨l/oslı´ca, lion/lioness that the special term ‘markedness ’
is appropriate. But when we consider additional behavioral criteria besides
contrastive predication, we see that diﬀerent kinds of term pairs show quite
diﬀerent behavior, and we need more than the three categories ‘no conven-
tionalization’, ‘ incipient conventionalization’, and ‘full conventionalization’.
Let us call the two members of a term pair ‘ term-1 ’ and ‘term-2’.
The most permissive criterion seems to be that of heterogenous plurals, i.e.
the plural of term-1 refers to a group that includes members described by
term-2. Thus, lions can refer to a group of both lionesses and male lions, and
in German, A¨ rzte (the plural of Arzt) can refer to a group of male physicians
(Arzt) and female physicians (A¨ rztin). In Spanish, even padres (plural of
padre ‘ father ’) can refer to a pair consisting of a father and a mother (i.e. the
parents).
However, another criterion is the use of term-1 for term-2 in specific ref-
erence. This is possible for lion/lioness, but not for German Arzt/A¨ rztin or
Spanish padre/madre :
(5) (a) I saw a lion. (It was a lioness.)
(b) *Ich sah einen Arzt. (Es war eine A¨rztin.)
‘ I saw a doctor. It was a female doctor. ’
(c) *Vi a un padre. Fue una madre.
‘ I saw a father/parent. It was a mother. ’
To test whether we are dealing with true hyponymy, we can use a frame
such as ‘A term-2 is a (particular kind of) term-1 ’. By this criterion, we may
still have hyponymy with Arzt/A¨ rztin, but cow/bull is not hyponymy any-
more (let alone king/queen) :
(6) (a) A lioness is a female lion.
(b) ?Eine A¨rztin ist ein weiblicher Arzt.
(c) *A bull is a male cow. (Lyons 1977: 309)
(d) *A queen is a female king.
Yet other criteria, such as ‘That 1 is a 2’ (e.g. That lion is a lioness/??That
cow is a bull), and the non-specific use of 1 for 2 (I’m looking for a lion may
imply that I would also be satisfied with a female lion, cf. Doleschal 1995),
may give still diﬀerent results. And some lexical items may behave totally
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idiosyncratically: man is the only word in English that can have an inclusive
sense only in a generic context (also the inclusive sense in the plural seems to
be possible only in generic contexts). The behavior of these pairs and a few
more can be summarized as in table 3.19 This table shows an interesting
pattern, but saying that term-1 is ‘unmarked’ and term-2 is ‘marked’ does
not help much to describe or understand the pattern. Language learners need
to acquire much more specific properties of these words, so linguistic de-
scriptions cannot content themselves with a simple bifurcation either. And to
really explain what is going on, we need to refer to a variety of factors,
among them clearly frequency of use: in the pair dog/bitch, bitch has a much
lower proportional frequency than queen has in the pair king/queen, so it
is not surprising that it behaves more like a hyponym of dog. (We find a
diﬀerent frequency eﬀect in pairs that have nothing to do with gender : in
pairs like vehicle/bus, term-2 is relatively more frequent, whereas in pairs like
soldier/general, term-1 is relatively more frequent. Again, the frequency is
apparently relevant to explaining the diﬀerence in behavior.)
In grammatical semantics, too, hyponomy or semantic specification is in-
suﬃcient as an explication of semantic markedness. As in lexical semantics,
or even more so, the neutralizing contexts are highly specific and must be
TERM 1 TERM 2
CONTRASTIVE
PREDICATION
EXCLUDED
(‘this is a 1,
not a 2’)
SPECIFIC
USE OF 1
FOR 2
‘I saw a 1’
(meaning
‘I saw 2’)
‘ that 1
is a 2’
HYPONYMY
(‘2 is a
(particular)
kind of 1 ’)
NONSPECIFIC
USE OF 1
FOR 2 (‘I’m
looking
for a 1’
includes 2)
HETERO-
GENEOUS
PLURALS
(‘1s ’ can
stand for
‘1s and 2s’)
vehicle bus Y Y Y Y Y Y
soldier general ?? Y Y Y Y Y
lion lioness ?? Y Y Y Y Y
cow bull – ? ?? ? ? Y
house church – ? ?? ?? ?* ?
Arzt A¨ rztin – – – ? Y Y
padre madre – – – – – Y
man woman – – – – – (Y)
king queen – – – – – –
Table 3
Diﬀerent term pairs and diﬀerent potential ‘markedness’ criteria
[19] There is a fair amount of between-speaker variation in English. I am grateful to Jim
Blevins, Juliette Blevins, Bernard Comrie, Grev Corbett, Jeﬀ Good, Orin Gensler, and
David Kamholz for sharing their intuitions with me.
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learned for each language and for each category separately. In English, it is
not possible to use the present tense in many past contexts even when the
past tense is redundant (*Yesterday I lose my keys), and similarly the singular
is not usable for plural reference even where there is no need for it (*three
book). In other languages, these sentences are perfectly normal (in fact, many
languages require the singular in combination with numerals). Similarly, the
(allegedly marked) perfective aspect is obligatory in many contexts in
Russian, and the details of the use of the perfective/imperfective aspects are
highly complex and language-particular.
We can conclude that grammars do not become significantly more elegant
if we build markedness into them, and it has not been shown that any con-
cept of markedness helps us understand whatever general patterns may lie
behind the cross-linguistic and intra-linguistic diversity in lexical and gram-
matical semantic contrasts.
What clearly remains valid is the cross-linguistic tendency for distribu-
tional asymmetries of the kind discussed here to correlate with overt coding
and frequency: the more frequent term of an opposition tends to be coded
with less material or zero (see section 4), and the more frequent term tends to
be more widely distributed. But the wider distribution of terms like lion, cow,
dog is not in the first instance due to their greater frequency – rather, it is due
to their wider meaning, which is itself ultimately due to the lower frequency
of the opposite meaning.
6. REPLAC ING ‘ PHONOLOG ICAL MARKEDNES S’
Markedness in phonology has recently been critically discussed in some de-
tail by Hume (2004) (‘Deconstructing markedness’) and by Blevins (2004)
(see also Gurevich 2001). Blevins states that in her approach, which empha-
sizes the role of regularities of sound change for explaining synchronic
grammars (‘Evolutionary Phonology’),
there is no clear role formarkednesswithin synchronicphonology.Absolute
universals and universal tendencies in sound patterns emerge from general
pathways of language change, and have no independent status in the
grammar_ there is a great deal of empirical evidence against the direct
incorporation of markedness into synchronic grammars. (Blevins 2004: 20)
Hume and Blevins downplay markedness because it is too abstract a notion,
and they would rather explain the corresponding phenomena directly in
terms of phonetics, language use and language change.20
[20] Cf. also formulations such as the following from the closing paragraph of Crosswhite
(2004: 226): ‘ there is no such thing as a monolithic concept of markedness_ In eﬀect, the
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But even those who are more interested in the most abstract properties of
the cognitive code have good reasons to be suspicious of markedness ex-
planations. Thus, Hale & Reiss (2000: 162), who take an antifunctionalist,
strictly Chomskyan stance, observe :
[M]any of the so-called phonological universals (often discussed under the
rubric of markedness) are in fact epiphenomena deriving from the inter-
section of extragrammatical factors like acoustic salience and the nature of
language change.
Thus, in phonology, the relevance of ‘markedness ’ has already been ques-
tioned quite radically by prominent phonologists, so that my treatment of
phonological markedness can be relatively brief.
In the list of senses in section 2 I started with ‘specification for a phono-
logical distinction’ (sense 1) because this was the original sense of the term
‘marked’. The only criterion admitted by Trubetzkoy for identifying the
‘mark-bearing’ term was language-particular neutralization (a kind of re-
stricted distribution, sense 10). But already Jakobson (1941) associated
asymmetries in phonological oppositions with diﬀerences in phonetic com-
plexity and ‘contrastive optimality’ (see 1941[1962: 373f.]), so he was the first
to introduce the notion of markedness as a universal property of sounds that
is rooted in phonetic diﬃculty (sense 4). In the same work, he also noted that
markedness is reflected in typological patterns (languages have marked
phonemes only if they have the corresponding unmarked phonemes, sense 9),
and in the order of acquisition and loss of phonological contrasts. Greenberg
(1966) was not interested in the nature of phonological systems as such, but he
stressed the apparently universal correlation between neutralization, typo-
logical implication, text frequency, and two other phenomena: allophonic
variation and phonemic diﬀerentiation. Thus, the following observable
phenomena should all identify the same properties as marked and unmarked:
(i) NEUTRALIZATION: In neutralization, the unmarked term stands for the
marked term (e.g. in German, the voiced-voiceless opposition is neu-
tralized in obstruents syllable-finally in favor of voiceless obstruents).
(ii) TYPOLOGICAL IMPLICATION: If a language has the marked term, it has the
unmarked term.
(iii) FREQUENCY:Theunmarked term ismore frequent than themarked term.
(iv) ALLOPHONIC VARIATION: The unmarked term shows greater allophonic
variation than the marked term (e.g. Nootka unglottalized stops have
aspirated and unaspirated allophones, whereas glottalized stops have
just a single allophone).
phonological concept of markedness has been replaced by phonetic considerations, which
are encoded in phonology using phonetically motivated constraints’.
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(v) PHONEMIC DIFFERENTIATION: The unmarked value may be more diﬀer-
entiated, i.e. there may be more phonemes having this value (e.g.
languages may have more nonnasal vowels than nasal vowels, and they
never have fewer).
Greenberg thus saw phonological markedness as a multidimensional cor-
relation, just like morphological and lexical markedness (see section 2.4,
section 4.5 above), and he emphasized the similarities between the charac-
teristics in (i)–(v) and those that he identified in morphology and the lexicon
(see also Croft 1990: ch. 4). However, he also noted that frequency cannot be
the single explanatory factor for the correlation, unlike in grammar and
lexicon, and Croft (2003: 117–120) no longer includes the phonological cor-
relations in his markedness concept.
In more recent work on phonological markedness (e.g. McCarthy &
Prince 1994, de Lacy 2002, Rice 2003), two other markedness correlates have
become prominent:
(vi) INSTABILITY INASSIMILATION: Unmarked segments assimilate more easily
than marked segments (e.g. Korean kotpalopkoppalo ‘ straight ’, but
papto ‘ rice also’ does not become *patto ; Rice 2003: 395).
(vii) EMERGENCE OF THE UNMARKED: In epenthesis, only unmarked segments
appear (e.g. [e], [t]).
As in the case of morphology and semantics, there is some question about
whether the correlations actually hold even as statistical tendencies,21 and
most of the available evidence for (or against) them is anecdotal. But to the
extent that they do hold, it is clear that it is more promising to try to account
for the various correlating dimensions individually than to reify the corre-
lations as ‘markedness’ (perhaps encoded as such in individual grammars or
even in Universal Grammar, i.e. in the cognitive code for grammars).
As Croft (2003: 120) notes, the explanation for the correlations ‘ is likely to
be found in articulatory and acoustic phonetics ’, so let us start with ‘mark-
edness as phonetic diﬃculty’ (sense 4, section 2.2.1 above). Just as conceptual
diﬃculty is causally related to rarity in texts (see section 4.4), phonetic diﬃ-
culty or complexity is closely related to rarity. Phoneme systems are more
eﬃcient (in particular, more speaker-friendly) if they privilege articulatorily
simple segments than if they privilege more complex segments.22 While the
hearer would have no gain, the speaker would suﬀer if a language used its
ejective or palatalized consonants more often than its plain consonants. This
[21] For instance, de Lacy (2002: 6) claims that ‘there are no asymmetries in assimilation and
coalescence’, contrary to what appears to be the majority opinion.
[22] The same is true for other phonological units such as syllables, but to keep the discussion
simple, I focus on segments here.
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is thus an economy consideration, similar to the explanation of the corre-
lation between shortness and frequency (see section 4.3). It seems that the
causal direction can go both ways (as with conceptual diﬃculty, section 4.4) :
articulatory complexity can cause rarity (because speakers will unconsciously
prefer expressions with simple segments for items that occur frequently in
discourse, and this will find its reflection in the system), and frequency can
cause articulatory simplicity (because when contrasts are given up after be-
coming redundant, this often involves articulatory simplification). The same
is true for perceptual diﬃculty: perceptually salient (=easy-to-perceive)
segments will be preferred by speakers in discourse and thus become frequent
in the system. According to Hume (2004), ‘sound sequences with richer cues
[i.e. perceptually more salient sound sequences] tend to be more stable in a
language and consequently, typically occur in more words than those with
weaker cues ’.
The greater distributional range of some segments compared to others
(including neutralization) is also mostly due to phonetic diﬃculty. German
voiced obstruents do not occur syllable-finally because, for phonetic reasons,
voice contrasts are harder to maintain in this position (see, e.g., Blevins 2004:
103–106). In Bulgarian unstressed syllables, the contrast between /i/–/e/, and
between /u/–/o/, is neutralized in favor of the high vowel (Trubetzkoy 1939:
73), because /i/ and /u/ are more salient and contrast better with /a/ than /e/
and /o/ (Crosswhite 2004). The distributional restrictions on phonetically
diﬃcult segments contribute further to the higher frequency of the easier
segments, but they hardly suﬃce to explain the diﬀerences (cf. the analogous
discussion for meaningful elements in section 4.2) because more complex
segments are generally rarer also in non-neutralized positions (e.g. palata-
lized consonants in Russian are rarer also before vowels, voiced obstruents
are rarer in German also in syllable-initial position).
Likewise, typological implication can be explained by phonetic diﬃculty if
one assumes the generally accepted regularity that the ability to perform a
more diﬃcult task implies the ability to perform easier tasks. Speakers who
master a voiced uvular stop [G] should also be able to pronounce the velar [g].
And if for some reason /g/ disappeared from the language, /G/ would prob-
ably soon be pronounced [g] because there would be no need for the extra
articulatory eﬀort required to pronounce [G]. Similarly, if hearers can per-
ceive a relatively non-salient contrast like that between [ø] and [e], they will
also be able to distinguish between [i] and [e] (thus leading to the typological
law that an /ø/ in the system implies an /e/) ; and if for some reason the /e/
disappeared, /ø/ would presumably shift to /e/, thus making the contrast
maximally salient.23
[23] A somewhat diﬀerent, diachronic explanation for such implications is proposed by
Greenberg (1966) and Bybee (2001: 202).
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The other correlates of phonological ‘markedness’ can be explained by
frequency of use and predictability (Hume 2004). Rare segments are unex-
pected, i.e. hard to predict, so they resist assimilation. By contrast, ‘ the
greater the predictability of an element, the less information content it has
and_ the more expendable it is ’ (Hume 2004: section 5.1). The explanation
for instability in assimilation is thus very similar to the explanation given for
articulatory simplicity above. Hume also argues that the appearance of
‘unmarked’ vowels in epenthesis is due to their higher frequency: it is ‘a seg-
ment’s predictability in a given context that is crucial in determining whether
it will be perceived as the epenthetic vowel ’ (Hume 2004: section 5.3).
Since frequency may diﬀer to some extent across languages, for a variety of
reasons, the frequency eﬀects are sometimes diﬀerent in diﬀerent languages.
Thus, while English-speaking children usually acquire /k/ later than /t/,
Japanese-speaking children have more diﬃculty with /t/ than with /k/. The
reason is simply that Japanese has a higher frequency of /k/ (Hume 2004:
section 5.2, citing work by Mary Beckman and colleagues).
Thus, phonological contrasts are similar to semantic contrasts in that we
appear to find evidence for cross-linguistic correlations between a number of
logically independent dimensions. But as in the case of meaningful (lexical
and morphological) categories, ‘markedness’ is not needed, because the
correlations can be explained directly with reference to phonetic factors and
frequency of use. An abstract markedness notion, whether intended as a
claim about the cognitive code, as a convenient metagrammatical term, or as
an explanatory concept in an autonomous theory of markedness (see section
3), only makes it harder to understand the cross-linguistic and language-
particular patterns.
7. REPLAC ING ‘MARKEDNES S AS MORPHOLOG ICAL D IFF ICULTY’
Natural morphologists havemade a number of claims about the ‘naturalness ’
(=unmarkedness) of morphological structures. In particular, they have
claimed that the better a structure fares with respect to a number of ‘natural-
ness parameters ’, the more frequent it will be within and across languages,
and the more robust it will be in psycholinguistic evidence and in language
change. The main universal naturalness parameters are constructional ico-
nicity, uniformity, and transparency (see section 2.2.2). I will discuss each of
these in turn, and then go on to discuss ‘system-dependent naturalness ’.
Constructional iconicity essentially means that ‘what is ‘‘more ’’ semanti-
cally should also be ‘‘more’’ constructionally ’ (Mayerthaler 1981: 25, cf.
Wurzel 1994: 2592). This was already discussed toward the end of section 2.4,
where we saw that the basic generalization is easily explained by economy:
what is used more frequently is shorter in any rational communication sys-
tem. No appeal to an iconicity principle is needed (see also Haspelmath, in
preparation). The natural morphologists have proposed a more fine-grained
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scale between maximal iconicity (when segments are added, as in English
boy/boys), minimal iconicity (when the two categories just diﬀer in the shape
of the stem, as in goose/geese), non-iconicity (as in sheep/sheep), and counter-
iconicity (as in Welsh plu-en ‘ feather’/plu ‘ feathers ’). That counter-iconicity
should be dispreferred is also predicted by frequency-based economy, and
the obvious problemwith ‘non-iconicity ’ is its uninformativeness (though this
can arise only in languages that usually do have a clearly coded distinction;
quite a few languages have no nominal singular–plural distinction at all).
More interestingly, the apparent preference for ‘maximal iconicity ’ over
‘minimal iconicity ’ may well be an artifact of historical pathways. Bybee &
Newman (1995) argue that stem changes (as in goose/geese) are just as easy to
learn and process as aﬃxes, and that the fact that they are generally rarer
both within and across languages has a diachronic explanation: morphology
generally arises via the grammaticalization of earlier lexical items, and hence
stem changes do not have the same opportunities as aﬃxes to arise in the first
place. Since they are generally rare within a language, it is expected that they
should often be under pressure to be leveled on the analogy of the more
widespread aﬃxational patterns, and that they do not often become fully
productive. The low type frequency of stem changes can also be made re-
sponsible for the diﬃculties they present in acquisition and processing.
However, once a language has a fully productive system of stem changes, this
may well be stable for millennia, as the Semitic languages show.
Uniformity means that stem morphemes show no allomorphy. The widely
observed tendency to eliminate stem alternations (as in the change from
brethren to brothers, or from hou[z]es to hou[s]es) is attributed to this mark-
edness/naturalness principle. Mayerthaler (1987: 49) claims that it is ‘based
upon biologically given preferences of the human brain’, and links it to the
perceptual preference for ‘object constancy’. But it is possible to be more
specific. As Bybee (1985: 119–123) noted, leveling of stem alternations is
highly frequency-sensitive: ‘ the proposal that infrequently-used forms fade
[from memory] accounts for the tendency to regularize infrequent irregular
forms, for an irregular form that is not suﬃciently reinforced will be replaced
by a regular formation’ (1985: 119). Thus, stem alternations in highly fre-
quent words (like does, says) can be very stable, and they do not make the
morphology any more diﬃcult for language users (cf. Werner 1989).
Transparency is the tendency for morphological paradigms to avoid
homonymy. At some level such a principle may well exist, but again its eﬀects
are not independent of frequency: as we saw in section 4.5, the rarer mor-
phological categories tend to exhibit less diﬀerentiation, i.e. more syncretism/
homonymy, than the more frequent categories, the reason being that the
distinctions are harder to remember in the rare categories. Thus, although
transparent paradigms make life easier for the hearer, the learner may well
find them harder or ‘unnatural ’. A single dimension of naturalness/un-
markedness is clearly insuﬃcient here.
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Finally, Wurzel (1984, 1987) also extends the notion of unnaturalness/
markedness to language-particular phenomena: ‘what is ‘‘better’’ or
‘‘worse’’ in the morphology for speakers, what is more marked or less
marked, depends crucially on what is normal in their system’ (Wurzel 1994:
2594). This explains why in some cases more homonymy is introduced. For
example, in German the dative form dem Ba¨ren ‘ to the bear ’ is giving way to
dem Ba¨r-Ø in the colloquial language, although it runs counter to construc-
tional iconicity. But the predominant nominal pattern is the one without a
suﬃx in the dative case (e.g. dem Wolf ‘ to the wolf ’), and so the minority
paradigm of Ba¨r/Ba¨ren simply joins the majority paradigm of Wolf. As
Wurzel recognizes, the crucial factor here is type frequency (although he calls
it ‘normalcy’, as if it were not easily measurable). As Bybee (1995) (among
many others) emphasizes, type frequency is one of the key factors de-
termining morphological productivity, for well-understood psychological
reasons. Wurzel (2000) (and similarly in earlier work, cf. 1984: 136ﬀ.) also
claims that words belonging to minority classes are ‘marked’ in that they
require an additional lexical specification.24 Thus, Ba¨r (in the standard lan-
guage) requires the lexical specification ‘n-declension’, whereas Wolf re-
quires no such specification. Thus, ‘morphological diﬃculty’ here reduces to
remembering an additional piece of information about a word. But in a more
psychologically oriented model such as Bybee’s, there is no simple contrast
between specification and non-specification. Instead, the organization in
memory of both words and patterns is highly dependent on their use, es-
pecially their frequency, and in some cases there is every reason to believe that
even predictable information is stored (highly frequent regular words must
have separate storage of their inflected forms, otherwise it would be imposs-
ible to explain how they could become irregular, as in the case of have/has).
Thus, the tendencies that natural morphologists have tried to explain by
invoking a notion of markedness/unnaturalness as diﬃculty can all be ex-
plained by independently motivated factors. ‘Markedness’ is superfluous.
8. REPLAC ING THE S IX ROLES OF MARKEDNES S
Let me now address the various roles that markedness has been given by
linguists (cf. section 3), and briefly say why markedness is not necessary at
each of these levels. Actually, I will only mention the first five roles of section
3, because the sixth role has already been dismissed.
(i) MARKEDNESS AS REPRESENTED IN PARTICULAR GRAMMARS. This concept
has not been prominent since Trubetzkoy (even Jakobson later came to
emphasize the universal nature of markedness asymmetries). Language
[24] In this way, Wurzel’s use of ‘markedness’ in the context of inflectional classes comes to
resemble senses 1 and 2 above.
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descriptions (such as reference grammars or dictionaries) get by easily
without reference to markedness. Even in purely theoretical descrip-
tions, it turns out on closer examination that markedness does not lead
to greater elegance of description. For example, Lyons (1977: 308)
argues that the twofold function of words like dog (in pairs like dog/
bitch) ‘should not be treated as an instance of polysemy’, because such
words are widespread throughout the English lexicon, and one would
expect polysemy to idiosyncratically target particular words. However,
aswe saw in section 5, word pairs of this kind can in fact behave in awide
variety of ways, so a single markedness notion does not really help.
(ii) MARKEDNESS AS PART OF THE COGNITIVE CODE (‘UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR’).
Generative grammarians have typically tried to do two things simul-
taneously: characterize the innate cognitive prerequisites for acquiring
a language (i.e. the cognitive code), and account for the limits on cross-
linguistic variation. Thus, Chomsky & Halle (1968: ch. 9) tried to refine
their formal descriptive framework in such a way that the diﬀerence
betweenacross-linguisticallywidespread(‘natural ’)pattern(e.g.avowel
inventory /i e a o u/) and an unusual pattern (e.g. a vowel inventory /y œ
a v i/, Chomsky & Halle 1968: 402) would fall out from it. With their
‘marking conventions’, they eﬀectively built the explanation for the
cross-linguistic patterns into their descriptive framework. They did not
even consider the possibility that the cross-linguistic patterns could
have totally diﬀerent, extralinguistic explanations, unrelated to the
limitations of the cognitive code (just as organisms are constrained
much more by factors other than the limitations of the genetic code;
see Haspelmath 2004a). This was already pointed out by Anderson
(1974: 293), who noted that phonological structures ‘closely mirror the
mechanisms of speech physiology insofar as we understand them’. He
continues :
One must start from the description and search for an explanation,
rather than attempting to make the explanation shape the descrip-
tion. A correct substantive theory of [naturalness issues], then, is not
to be sought in a restructuring of phonological description as is im-
plicit in [Chomsky & Halle’s] marking conventions.
About three decades later, the currently most popular generative
framework, Optimality Theory (OT), still tries to apply Chomsky &
Halle’s (1968) old strategy of building explanations into descriptions.
McCarthy (2002: 2) writes :
One of the most compelling features of OT, in my view, is the way
that it unites description of individual languages with explanation in
language typology_ the grammar of one language inevitably in-
corporates claims about the grammars of all languages.
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But for the same reasons, this strategy of OT cannot work: ‘marked-
ness ’ phenomena are ultimately due to substantive factors, and abstract
innate constructs such as OT constraints are simply not the right place
for explanation (see especially Blevins (2004: ch. 9) for a critique of OT
in phonology, and Haspelmath (1999b) for a more general critique).
(iii) MARKEDNESS AS A METAGRAMMATICAL CONCEPT (as used by Greenberg
(1966) and Croft (1990, 2003) for a multidimensional correlation). Here
I would argue that retaining a separate label, even when it is recognized
that frequency diﬀerences explain the correlation, only leads to con-
fusion.25 The same is true for ‘markedness ’ in the sense of ‘narrowly
distributed’ or ‘non-default ’. Metagrammatical terms should be maxi-
mally transparent, and there should be no need for linguistics-specific
terminology at this level of generality.
(iv) MARKEDNESS AS AN EXPLANATORY CONCEPT. As Wurzel (1998) and other
natural morphologists recognize, the ultimate explanation for regu-
larities of language structure is in terms of substantive factors outside
the language system. If one posits an abstract intermediate ‘explana-
tory’ level between the phenomena and the real explanatory factors,
one bears the burden of proof that such a level is needed. I have argued
(section 7) that it is superfluous.
(v) MARKEDNESS AS A GENERAL PROPERTY OF HUMAN CULTURE. Frequency
asymmetries and expectations based on such asymmetries also occur
outside of language. Mayerthaler (1981 : 48) cites the example of
clothing habits on beaches: normally people wear bathing suits, so
naked bathing is the marked case. On nudist beaches, we find
markedness reversal – wearing a bathing suit becomes marked, i.e.
unexpected, and therefore remarkable. Jakobson (in his 1930 letter to
Trubetzkoy) mentions the Soviet policy shift from the default as-
sumption that people are pro-Soviet to the default expectation that
people are against the regime (‘all those who are not with us are against
us ’). This example shows that default expectations can be influenced
by factors other than frequency asymmetries (e.g. paranoid imagin-
ation of frequency asymmetries) ; but such factors seem irrelevant for
language, and the concept of ‘default expectation’ seems fully satis-
factory to describe such situations. More interesting is the claim in
Moravcsik&Wirth (1986) that non-linguistic cultural items such as food
and clothing tend to show the same correlation between frequency,
[25] This is implicitly recognized by Croft (2003: 87), who replaces the chapter heading
‘Markedness’ of Croft (1990) by ‘Typological markedness’. However, this latter term does
not improve the situation greatly, because it has been used widely in the sense of typological
implication (sense 9, section 2.3.3), and this is not even one of the correlates that Croft
(2003) discusses.
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diversity and simplicity that is seen in language: everyday clothing is
more frequent, comes in more diﬀerent kinds, and is simpler than fes-
tive attire (and similarly for food). Here the simplicity cannot be due to
frequency, but in fact there is no correlation: zero clothing (or food),
which would be predicted to be even more frequent than simple
clothing (or food), is in fact even rarer than festive attire (or holiday
food). And the correlation with diversity does not hold either : many
people have a much greater range of holiday clothes, contrasting with
uniform working clothes. For food, if there is a correlation at all, it is
explainable by memory limitations (cf. the explanation for reduced
inflectional diﬀerentiation in rare categories, section 4.5(iii)) : recipes
that are used rarely are less easily remembered. Those who cook from
cookbooks (or go to a restaurant) on special days do not have to suﬀer
from this unfortunate restriction on food diversity.
9. CONCLUS ION
Some writers on markedness complain that ‘capturing exactly what mark-
edness means is by no means a straightforward task’ (Rice 2003: 390). In this
paper, I have not set out to find ‘the’ meaning of ‘markedness’, but I have
attempted to identify and characterize a range of diﬀerent senses (and con-
texts) in which the term is used in linguistics. While Rice (2003: 419) believes
that ‘ [m]arkedness is something about which linguists come to have strong
intuitions’, I find little evidence for the hope that these intuitions overlap
suﬃciently to allow us to agree on a common textbook standard anytime
soon. On the contrary, it seems that the ‘ intuitive ’ shared sense of ‘marked/
unmarked’ is not distinguishable from the sense of everyday words like
uncommon/common, abnormal/normal, unusual/usual, unexpected/expected.
Apart from the larger class of markedness as abnormality (section 2.3), we
also find markedness as complexity (section 2.1) and as diﬃculty (section
2.2), but since complexity and diﬃculty typically lead to lower frequency,
abnormality is in eﬀect what all markedness senses share. But we do not need
a technical linguistic term for abnormality/uncommonness/unusualness/
unexpectedness. Simple everyday concepts should be expressed by simple
everyday words.
In sections 4–7, I have addressed the various senses of markedness indi-
vidually, trying to show for each sense how we can deal with the observed
phenomena in an insightful way without invoking a markedness notion. A
summary of the conclusions is provided in table 4.
I conclude that linguists can dispense with the term ‘markedness’ and
many of the concepts that it has been used to express. It can be readily
replaced by other concepts and terms that are less ambiguous, more trans-
parent and provide better explanations for the observed phenomena. At the
very least, non-use of this term by authors should become readers’ default
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TYPE OF MARKEDNESS DOMAIN
SALIENT
REPRESENTATIVE WHAT TO REPLACE IT WITH
DISCUSSED
HERE IN_
1. Markedness as
specification for a
phonological distinction
phonemes Trubetzkoy 1939 detailed phonetic and
distributional description
section 2.1.1
2. Markedness as
specification for a
semantic distinction
lexical items,
grammatical categories
Jakobson 1932 detailed semantic description
and pragmatic analysis
section 5
3. Markedness as overt
coding
morphosyntactic
categories
(passim) ‘overt coding/zero coding’ section 4.3
4. Markedness as
phonetic diﬃculty
phonological/phonetic
categories
Hayes &
Steriade 2004
detailed study of phonetic
factors
section 6
5. Markedness as
morphological diﬃ-
culty/unnaturalness
morphological patterns Dressler et al.
1987, Wurzel
1998
general principles of mental
organization of words
(especially frequency
diﬀerences)
section 7
6. Markedness as
conceptual diﬃculty
(grammatical)
conceptual categories
Givo´n 1991, 1995 conceptual diﬃculty
(sometimes due to rarity of
occurrence)
section 4.4
7. Markedness as rarity in
texts
any linguistic element
or pattern
Greenberg 1966 ‘rarity in texts ’ section 4.2
M
A
R
T
I
N
H
A
S
P
E
L
M
A
T
H
6
4
8. Markedness as rarity in
the world
anything that people
can perceive
(passim) ‘rarity in the world’ section 4.2
9. Markedness as
typological implication
or cross-linguistic rarity
phonological categor-
ies, syntactic patterns
Jakobson 1941,
1963
‘typological implication,
cross-linguistic rarity ’
section 6
10. Markedness as
restricted distribution
phonological and
grammatical categories,
lexical items, syntactic
patterns
(passim) 1. restricted distribution vs.
unrestricted distribution
2. specifically defined
distribution vs. default
distribution
section 2.3.4
11. Markedness as
deviation from default
parameter setting
parametric options Chomsky 1981 ‘deviation from default
parameter setting’
section 2.3.5
12. Markedness as a multi-
dimensional
correlation
grammatical categories,
lexical items (and
perhaps phonological
categories)
Greenberg 1966,
Croft 1990
rarity/frequency in texts and
its consequences
section 4.5
Table 4
The twelve markedness senses, their domains and salient representatives, and what to replace them with
A
G
A
I
N
S
T
M
A
R
K
E
D
N
E
S
S
6
5
expectation, so that authors who feel that they need the term are obliged to
motivate its use.
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